In the hearts of many people, the passion persists for treaties as the solution to the continuing dilemma of U.S.-Soviet relations. Why can’t we compromise, come to an agreement, and put this problem of nuclear weapons behind us?
There is just one little fly in the ointment which is hard to understand for those who live in a society where contracts must be lived up to or damages paid. If the concept of arms control treaties is to have any meaning beyond providing “busy-work” for the State Department, it is essential that all parties comply with them.
The President’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament recently issued a 15-page report called “A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983.” It makes one wonder why we even bother to discuss new agreements; the Soviet fulfillment record is so bad.
We didn’t hear about violations during the Ford Administration because Henry Kissinger was the architect of SALT I and in charge of overseeing compliance, and it was in his self-interest to prevent the American people from knowing about Soviet violations. Likewise, it was in the Carter Administration’s interest to suppress news of the violations because Jimmy was trying to persuade the Senate to ratify SALT II.
Let’s look just at the violations of the 1972 SALT I Agreements which were immensely advantageous to the Soviet Union and disadvantageous to America even if their provisions had been faithfully kept by the Soviets. (But they have consistently violated them anyway.)
The SALT I Interim Agreement prohibits the conversion of launchers for light ICBMs into launchers for heavy ICBMs. The purpose of this provision was to limit the growth of ICBM throwweight and its potential counterforce capability (to knock out U.S. missiles).
The Soviets have been converting their launchers for light SS-11s into launchers for heavy SS-17s and SS-19s, thereby making a mockery of the treaty and defeating an essential objective of the treaty. This action is one of the principal factors in widening the margin of Soviet missile superiority over ours.
The SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT I ABM Treaty both prohibit the use of deliberate concealment measures which impede verification of compliance by national technical means. During the entire decade of the 1970s, the Soviets substantially increased their concealment activities which clearly impede U.S. verification efforts.
One example is the encryption of the SS-X-25 missile telemetry, which impedes U.S. ability to determine that missile’s characteristics. Another example of deliberate Soviet concealment activity supposedly prohibited by SALT I is the probable continued deployment of the SS-16 ICBM at Plesetsk.
The SALT I ABM Treaty prohibits the development and deployment of non-permanently fixed ABM radars. The Soviets did exactly that by the development and deployment of a radar on the Kamchatka Peninsula in 1975, and they have continued with their developmental activities there ever since.
The SALT I Interim Agreement requires the Soviets to dismantle ICBM launchers in order to compensate for building modern SLBM launchers in excess of 740. The Soviets simply did not dismantle their ICBM launchers when they added their new DELTA-class submarines in 1976 and 1977. The Soviets admitted this but failed to dismantle any faster.
The SALT I ABM Treaty limits the location and orientation of radar deployment to sites on the periphery of the national territory and stipulates that they be oriented outward. But the Soviets have constructed a large, phased-array radar in an interior site near Krasnoyarsk.
The President’s Advisory Committee concluded that the Soviets have several motives in noncompliance, in addition to the obvious military advantages. They may be trying to test the effectiveness of U.S. verification capabilities and of our ability to come to conclusions about noncompliance.
The Soviets may be testing U.S. resolve and responses to their noncompliance. They may be trying to raise the level of U.S. confusion in order to hide more serious covert activities, such as development and deployment of an anti-missile defense system.
How can we sign more treaties when the Soviets continue to violate past treaties and get by with it?
