American Presidents are somehow convinced that it is politically helpful to go to Russia and bring back an agreement, no matter how one-sided, signed by the Soviet dictator. President Roosevelt did that with Stalin at Teheran in 1943 and Yalta in 1945. Even President Nixon apparently believed that the SALT I agreement he signed in May 1972 helped him to defeat George McGovern decisively.
Now President Carter is making unnecessary and dangerous concessions in order to bring back a SALT II agreement. Paul H. Nitze, a former member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team and former Deputy Secretary of Defense, has charged that political pressures have led the Carter Administration to agree to certain proposals that compromise U.S. security.
Nitze, who is now a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, stated recently: “The President’s position is clear. He would like to come up with an agreement.” He added that Carter is “surrounded by people he wants to hear”, but who have little understanding of the strategic issue or the dangers of SALT II.
What are some of the concessions President Carter has made? First, he cancelled production of the best bomber in the world, the B-1. For this he neither received nor ever requested any concession from the Soviets.
Then President Carter announced that he would rely on our old B-52s to carry cruise missiles. However, he then agreed to limit the range of our cruise missiles. Soviet MIG-25 Foxbat interceptors, using tanker aircraft to refuel, could keep our slow-flying B-52 carriers more than 600 miles away from the Soviet Union. That’s too far away to hit most of the Soviet ICBM fields with cruise missiles.
On July 11 the Defense Department ordered the production of our Minuteman III missiles stopped. In November, the ten Minuteman contractors were asked if they could resume production again. Such off-again on-again production is not only very hard on the skilled employees, but very expensive.
Meanwhile the Soviets are producing one new supersonic bomber, the Tupolev Backfire, four new intercontinental land missiles, the SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, and SS-20, one new submarine ballistic missile, and a new satellite killer weapon that was successfully tested on June 17.
The Soviet SS-20 missile is mobile and therefore cannot be effectively targeted. The United States has no mobile missiles, and no satellite killer weapons.
As stated by one Defense Department official to the highly respected AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY: “There is now a clear strategic weapons advantage by the Soviets over the U.S.”
Mobile missiles were not limited by the SALT I agreement, and the Soviets have taken full advantage of this loophole by going ahead with deployment of their SS-20. One of the most constructive and peace-stabilizing actions the United States could take would be to do likewise.
A stockpile of mobile missiles gives any attacker a great disadvantage. Because mobile missiles can be easily moved and camouflaged, it is estimated to require about 20 warheads to destroy a Single mobile-based missile. This means that an aggressor nation would have to use so many more of his own warheads than he could hope to destroy that there would be no profit in any attack.
Instead of freezing the present Soviet weapons advantage in SALT II, President Carter should order a go-ahead on the B-1 bomber, assure the continued production of Minuteman III missiles, remove the artificial limits on the range of our cruise missiles, and start production of mobile missiles.
