Fear of nuclear war is the specter which hangs over the SALT II hearings and debate. President Carter led off with the charge that those opposed to the treaty are warmongers. Gromyko escalated the emotion by ominously threatening that the Soviets may not talk to us again if the Senate does not ratify.
The hearings revealed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as men afraid of the consequences of rejection of SALT II. The searching TV camera closeups showed them unsure and halting, speaking slowly, weighing every word as though one slip might cause the world to cave in on them.
The Vance-Brown team gave viewers the impression that they are afraid to ask the Soviets for any concessions, no matter how reasonable, and afraid to repudiate the one-sided deal the Soviets forced upon us. Vance and Brown didn’t dare to ask the Soviets to agree to equality in missiles, megatonnage, MIRVs, throw-weight, bombers, or submarines.
The uncertain TV performance of Administration leaders was matched only by the obedient performance of our military leaders. It is difficult to see how anyone could seriously think they would dare to oppose Commander-in-Chief Carter on a major policy matter. Only retired officers have the liberty to do that, as General John K. Singlaub discovered.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1972 were conned into supporting SALT I on the Administration’s promise: Go along with SALT I and we will give you the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine; if you oppose SALT I, it will be approved anyway, but you won’t get the B-1 or the Trident. The JCS swallowed the bait and dutifully supported SALT I; but the B-1 was scrapped and not even one Trident is in the water yet.
The TV performances of our civilian and military leaders recall the words of the master strategist who started the Soviet Union on the greatest weapons-building program in all history. Nikita Khrushchev warned: “I’ve always realized full well that the fear of nuclear war in a country’s leader can paralyze that country’s defenses. And if a country’s defenses are paralyzed, then war really is inevitable: the enemy is sure to sense your fright and try to take advantage of it.”
Thus, it isn’t rejection of SALT II that will bring on war, but our leaders’ cringing fear of nuclear war. If the Kremlin bosses were watching U.S. television last month, they surely could sense the fright of Vance and Brown, and the total subservience of our military leaders to the Vance-Brown policies. We would be fools if we think the Soviets will not take advantage of that fear.
How different Vance’s behavior is from that of another Secretary of State, Christian Herter. After one of Khrushchev’s tantrums, on May 9, 1960, Secretary Herter explained U.S. policy with razor-sharp precision: “The threat of surprise attack presents a constant danger. It is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given the opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction.”
But that is exactly what SALT II does. It gives the Soviet political system the opportunity to make secret preparations to face the Free World with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. Although verification and cheating are major concerns, the more important factor is that SALT II allows the Soviets legally to build a first-strike, nuclear war-winning capability.
Lt. General Edward L. Rowny, a member of the U.S. SALT II negotiating team, testified that “the treaty would sanction and codify the strategic inferiority of the United States.” He said the treaty permits the Soviets to maintain 308 launchers for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles possessing more destructive power than all U.S. ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles combined.
If there ever was a debate which the American people should be allowed to see on national television, it is the forthcoming debate in the U.S. Senate on SALT II.
It would give us a chance to show the world that there are some American leaders who speak forthrightly for American interests and military strength, rather than cringing in fear which can only encourage the Soviets to press their advantage.
